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Are All R&D Dollars Created Equal? 
A LOOK AT THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL INVESTMENT ON PATENT SUCCESS 
 
Casey O’Neil 
 
Many have researched how Research and Development (R&D) spending affects innovation, but 
few have discussed the difference between federal and private investment.  Does a dollar 
invested by the government have a greater or weaker effect than a private dollar on the 
percentage of successful U.S. patent bids? 
This is an important question to answer.   Solow’s and Romer’s growth models can be 
used to show innovation is responsible for over 40% of an economy’s growth, and Arrow’s work 
proves the level of U.S. innovation is still below the social optimum.
1,2,3 
  Thus, it is important to 
find the most efficient way to increase innovation.  A definitive answer would determine whether 
the government should be directly funding R&D or if it can rely more on private funding.    After 
all, the purpose of government funding is to step in where the market does not provide an 
incentive for private funding.   If the more than $25 billion spent every year by the federal 
government is not effective, it can be cut from the budget.   
 While there are no studies addressing these exact questions, several studies do brush the 
topic.  A 2003 study by Paroma Sanyal concludes that federal and private funds both have a 
positive influence on the number of patents granted.  In particular, the study showed a greater 
effect by federal investment but still positive effect from private funding.
4
  It should be noted, 
however, that, the work does not address the success of those patents.  It is quite possible that 
federal investment only increased the quantity, not quality, of applications. 
 In 2008, David Nevy and Nestor Terleckyj found that federal funding has a positive 
effect on private funding.   Specifically, one dollar of federal funding stimulates $0.27 of private 
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investment. 
5
 While Sanval did not explore this dimension of federal-private investment 
relationship, Nevy and Terleckyj’s study suggests the coefficient on federal funding is higher 
than that on private funding.  
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
I constructed a time series dataset using information from the National Science 
Foundation (NSF), Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO), and U.S. Census Bureau.  The data span 45 years (1963-2007) and specifically 
provide data on U.S. federal investment, U.S. private investment, U.S. real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), annual U.S. unemployment rates, the quantity of utility patent applications 
submitted by domestic entities, the number of those applications approved, and the previous 
stock of approved U.S. utility patents regardless of the application origin.  These are all national 
level data, not state or industry level; thus, policy recommendations that draw from the analysis 
must also be nationally focused.  The reasons for including these variables will be explained in 
the next section.   
One strength of this dataset is that it provides information on precisely what we seek to 
observe: utility patents granted to U.S. inventors.  It also provides information on potential 
influencers of patent success - thus allowing us to more accurately isolate the coefficient on the 
variables of interest – federal investment and private investment.   The last strength of the dataset 
is that it provides hard numbers.  This will produce a more unbiased analysis than survey data 
would. 
There are also several weaknesses inherent in the dataset.  Firstly, while it is possible the 
effect of funding depends on its structure, the data do not differentiate among different types of 
federal and private funding.  Does non-profit R&D spending produce different results than other 
private funds?  What about federal funds released through government contracts, or through 
university research?  The dataset also does not provide educational data before 1992.  I had 
hoped to include the number of bachelor degrees in the labor force as a regressor, but the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics only began tracking that information in 1992, thus including what is available 
would not suffice for a serious analysis.  The data also fall short in that they do not address other 
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patent types or applications of foreign origin.  Any recommendations will only be applicable to 
the United States. 
Ideally, I would like to have application level data.  With details to that extent it would be 
possible to estimate the effects using a logit model – thus predicting an individual patent 
application’s probability of success.  It would also be helpful to differentiate among different 
funding scenarios.  Identifying the best way to distribute funding would ensure effective R&D 
spending – regardless of whether it originates from a federal or private source.  I would also have 
liked to have data covering a longer time frame.  Because the USPTO did not differentiate 
between U.S. and foreign applicants prior to 1963, the data simply are not available.  
ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
I ran a robust ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression on the data.  The equation 
for the model is specified below: 
 
In this model, y represents the Portion of successful U.S. utility patents,   represents the 
constant,   through   represent the regressors (Logged Federal RD, Logged Private RD, Logged 
GDP, Logged Unemployment, Logged Quantity of U.S. Utility Patent Applications, Logged 
Number of Past Utility Patents, and Lagged Portion of successful U.S. utility patents), and   is 
the error term. 
For those unfamiliar with econometrics, the y variable is the dependent variable - its 
value is dependent on the x variables.  To put it another way, the x variables are the factors 
theorized to affect y.  Because the model is an estimate of best fit, epsilon then represents the 
difference between an estimated and observed value. 
This model was used because the data meet all the OLS assumptions.  They are normally 
distributed, independently and identically distributed, and the expected value of the error term is 
zero.  The dataset did not provide enough information to perform other types of analyses.  Panel 
data would be needed to perform fixed or random effects and a logit model would be appropriate 
if application-level data were available. 
Before performing the regression, I produced Kernel Density (kdensity) plots to observe 
the skewness of the variables.  The dependent variable, Portion of successful U.S. utility patents, 
is normally distributed and was thus left as-is.  Most of the regressors (specifically Federal RD, 
Private RD, GDP, Unemployment, Quantity of U.S. Utility Patent Applications, and Number of 
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Past Utility Patents) however, were skewed to the right.  I logged them so as to bring their 
distributions closer to normal, and thus increase the accuracy of the model. 
I then performed a cross-sectional time-series feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
regression to test heteroskedasticity (non-uniform variance) and autocorrelation (correlation of 
observations within a variable).  The results did show heteroskedasticity, but the robust option on 
the OLS regression can control the effects of that.  The same analysis tests for autocorrelation, 
but none was found.   Lastly, I tested for stationarity (statistical properties are consistent over 
time) of the dependent variable, Portion of successful U.S. utility patents.  The Dickey-Fuller test 
showed we cannot reject non-stationarity.  To account for this “walk” around the trend, a one-
year lag of the dependent variable was added as a regressor. 
I then regressed Portion of successful U.S. utility patents on the variables: Logged 
Federal RD, Logged Private RD, Logged GDP, Logged Unemployment, Logged Quantity of 
U.S. Utility Patent Applications, Logged Number of Past Utility Patents, and Lagged Portion of 
successful U.S. utility patents.  The results of this are shown in TABLE 1. 
A brief description of these variables and reasons for their inclusion in the regression is 
provided below: 
Portion of successful U.S. utility patents: Continuous variable between 0 and 1. It provides the 
percentage of submitted utility patent applications that were ultimately approved.  This is the 
regression’s dependent variable. 
Logged Federal RD:  Logged values of federal R&D spending – by source of funds.  Federal 
investment is a theorized positive influence, and is one of the primary variables of interest. 
Logged Private RD: Logged values of private R&D spending – by source of funds.  It is a 
theorized positive influence, and is the other primary variable of interest. 
Logged GDP: Logged values of the United States’ annual real GDP.  It is a theorized positive 
influence, and thus, is used as a control variable. 
Logged Unemployment: Logged values of the annual U.S. unemployment rates.  It is a theorized 
positive influence, and thus, used as another control variable. 
Logged Quantity of U.S. Utility Patent Applications: Logged values of the quantity of patent 
applications submitted each year.  A greater number of submissions could be due to an increase 
in low quality applications and would thus decrease the percentage of successful applications.  
For this reason, it is included as a control variable. 
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Logged Number of Past Utility Patents: Logged values of the annual stock of existing patents.  It 
is included in order to control for theorized positive impact a larger stock of knowledge and for 
the expected negative impact from having opportunities for a valid patent (the comparatively 
low-hanging fruit has been picked).  It is thus included as another control variable. 
Lagged Portion of successful U.S. utility patents: As discussed before, the dependent variable is 
non-stationary, and exhibits a “walk” around a trend.  Including this one-year lag as a regressor 
makes the estimation more accurate. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Regressing Portion of successful U.S. utility patents on the variables described above 
yields the values shown in TABLE 1. 
TABLE 1 
Regression of Portion of successful U.S. utility patents on Federal R&D and Private R&D 
 
RESULTS 
 OLS (no lag) OLS (with lag) 
logFederal -0.073        (0.19) -0.136          (0.19) 
logPrivate -0.230*      (0.11) -0.097          (0.13) 
logGDP 1.542**     (0.54) 1.099*          (0.60) 
logUnemployment 0.024         (0.09)  0.035           (0.09) 
logPatApps -0.054        (0.12) -0.028           (0.12) 
logPatStock  -1.746*      (0.90) -1.360           (0.92) 
Lagged Portion of Successful U.S. utility patents   0.187           (0.16) 
Constant 17.628**    (8.46) 14.277          (8.65) 
   
Observations 45 44 
Adj. R-squared 0.749 0.763 
Standard errors in parentheses  
** p<0.05, * p<0.10   
 
 From TABLE 1, we see the coefficients on the variables interest, Logged Federal RD and 
Logged Private RD, are not statistically significant.  This suggests that neither federal nor private 
investment, at least at a general level, increase the percentage of successful U.S. utility patents. 
 The results do not contradict Sanyal’s claim that both federal and private funds increase 
the quantity of patent applications.   Assuming the quality mix remains constant, an increase in 
applications would have no effect on the percentage of successful applications and would, in 
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turn, mean that the coefficients on Logged Federal RD and Logged Private RD would be 
insignificant.  Indeed, Logged Quantity of U.S. Utility Patent Applications is not significant, and 
neither is Logged Federal RD or Logged Private RD. 
Since federal spending is not observed to have a greater association than private 
spending, the results appear to contradict the Levy and Terleckyj’s study.  If, as Levy and 
Terleckyj found, federal funding stimulated a fraction of private funding, and as Sanyal states, 
both increase patent applications, the coefficient on Logged Federal RD would be greater than 
that on Logged Private RD.  This is not the case.  It is possible, though, that this is due to the 
placement of the stimulated investment.  If it is distributed equally across a constant quality mix 
(stimulated investment is not spent any more or less wisely than previous investment), the 
coefficients in our regression would be as observed. 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The regression results suggest that neither policies increasing federal funding nor those 
encouraging private investment will increase (or decrease) the percentage of successful U.S. 
utility patent bids.  As mentioned before, however, this study looks only at general investment.  
It does not address targeted funding strategies. 
It is logical, then, to look towards policies encouraging targeted investment.  Further 
studies should also be focused in this area.  We need more and better data – specifically 
application-level data, information on different funding scenarios, and data for more years.  By 
obtaining these data and identifying other potential determinants of patent success, one could 
better recommend policies to increase the efficacy of federal R&D funding. 
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